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From primal scenes to synthetic
cells
Abstract Synthetic cells spark intriguing questions about the nature of life. Projects such as BaSyC
(‘Building a Synthetic Cell’) aim to build an entity that mimics how living cells work from basic
components. But what kind of entity would a synthetic cell really be? I assess this question from a
philosophical perspective, and show how early fictional narratives of artificial life – such as the





he idea of producing something life-like
in vitro – or, more precisely, the idea of
building a synthetic cell – has been a key
objective of synthetic biology from the very out-
set of the field. Over the past twelve decades or
so, living cells have been effectively dissolved
into their basic molecular and informational
components. Now the time has come to put all
these components together again, in order to
address the question: do we really understand
life, or have we missed something?
I am a principal investigator on the BaSyC proj-
ect, which aims to build a synthetic cell that con-
vincingly mimics all the functions of a living cell.
BaSyC takes an engineering approach to this chal-
lenge, starting from the conviction that we can
only genuinely claim to understand life insofar as
we can technologically reproduce it. In other
words, to effectively demonstrate that the essence
of life has been duly grasped, we should be able to
produce something in vitro which not only main-
tains its internal metabolism but can actually repro-
duce itself.
As a philosopher in science, I study scientific
endeavours from an oblique or sideways perspec-
tive (Zwart, 2017; Zwart, 2018). This means that
my focus of attention concerns both the object
pole (that is, the synthetic cell) and the subject
pole of the knowledge production process (the sci-
entists and research groups working on this chal-
lenge). In other words, my focus is not on the
technical or compositional features of synthetic
cells, but on the dynamical interplay between sub-
ject and object.
My oblique perspective consists of three basic
methodological components. First of all, it builds
on the conviction that, in order to understand the
present and the emerging future, we have to take
a step backwards in time and return to the primal
scene of synthetic biology research: the birth of
the desire to create life in a test tube. A second
methodological principle is triangulation, which
means that we need a third position fromwhich we
can attempt to unravel the interaction between the
subject and the object. Such a position may be
provided by novels, movies or plays about the
desire to create artificial life. Thirdly, a synthetic
cell would be a new type of thing – an ontological
novelty in the language of philosophy – and, there-
fore, highly likely to lead to a range of responses.
Synthetic cells will trigger both fascination and
unease and it is precisely in works of the imagina-
tion, such as novels and plays, that we find these
mixed responses articulated, addressed and
fleshed out, albeit often in a dramatized fashion.
This explains why, through critical readings of sci-
ence novels, science cinema and science theatre,
we may explore (and to some extent predict) how
novelties such as synthetic cells will be received by
public audiences.
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The birth of the idea of creating
life in vitro
Several decades before synthetic biology – as
we currently know it – got off the ground, the
signifier ‘synthetic biology’ had already been
coined by Stephane Leduc (in 1912) to refer to
his research where he grew crystals in solutions
to mimic and explore organic forms (Cam-
pos, 2009). Even earlier, in 1905, the physicist
John Butler Burke was exposing petri dishes
containing bouillon to radium in order to pro-
duce artificial life-like forms, inspired by his con-
viction that radium could generate life. These
and similar experiments conveyed the idea,
articulated by the biologist Jacques Loeb and
others, that 20th century biology should become
biotechnology (Pauly, 1987). As JBS Haldane
said, paraphrasing Marx, “the vocation of scien-
tists is not to explain the living world, but to
change it” (Haldane, 1939). However, it was
only with the discovery of recombinant DNA
techniques in the 1970s that the engineering
approach to biology, also known as ‘intentional
biology’, really took off (Campos, 2009).
Yet, the idea of creating life in a test-tube
had thrived in books and plays long before it
became real science. Goethe (1831) explored
the idea of creating life in a laboratory in his
drama Faust, in a scene entitled “Laboratory”
(Part II Act II Scene 2; 6819 ff.), where Faust’s
trusted disciple Wagner successfully manages to
fabricate an artificial ‘little man’ (a homunculus)
in a glass phial in his oven. Goethe’s scene
became a classical enactment of ‘Faustian’ sci-
ence (Spengler, 1918): a form of science bent
on controlling and enhancing nature, rather than
on understanding it.
As indicated above, a rereading of this ‘pri-
mal scene’ may enlighten some of the expecta-
tions and concerns raised by synthetic biology,
and, more precisely, by synthetic cell projects.
Inside his phial, which he carefully keeps at the
right temperature, Wagner has composed the
right mixture with the right components to cre-
ate a kind of primal soup and, exactly at the
right moment (when the bell tolls), he discerns
the budding signs of neo-life. Something is
glowing inside the tube: a luminous substance,
reminiscent perhaps of the time-old association
between life and light that was taken up by the
physicist Niels Bohr in his famous lecture Light
and Life (Bohr, 1933). After many detours and
faux pas, Wagner’s hazardous experiment seems
about to succeed at last. What nature brings
forth in vivo can now ‘crystallise’ inside a glass
tube. Artificial life has been created in the lab.
What Wagner fabricated, I would argue, was
not so much an artificial life form as a prolific
narrative script, one that would soon proliferate
through the works of many other authors: from
Mary Shelley (Frankenstein) via H.G. Wells (The
Stolen Bacillus) up to contemporary writers. For
indeed, some typical components of this script
are already fleshed out quite recognisably by
Goethe in Faust. To begin with, he stresses the
fragility and vulnerability of neo-life. The homun-
culus can only survive inside his tube – in a gno-
tobiotic environment, technically speaking.
Should the glass phial break, exposure to a nor-
mal environment would prove fatal. This is a
reassuring thought, suggesting that neo-life can,
in the modern language of biosafety and biose-
curity, be ‘contained’. The survival of the artefact
depends on qualified researchers and the con-
trolled environments they created. Neo-life is
and will remain a laboratory artefact.
Unfortunately, this reassuring impression
does not last because, at precisely this moment,
when Wagner is about to finish his great experi-
ment, there is a knock on the door and Mephis-
topheles enters the room with the explicit
intention of stealing the tube. Mephistopheles
flees the laboratory, with the homunculus hidden
under his cloak, leaving Wagner behind to
resume and improve his experimental work. In
the current literature, this aspect is discussed
under headings such as ‘biosecurity’ or ‘dual
use’. Scientists may conduct their hard work with
the best of intentions, but others may use their
valuable products for nefarious goals. In this
manner, with the help of others, fragile little
‘monsters’ may escape the laboratory setting
after all.
In other words, a question emerges as soon
as we are able to control life: how do we control
this power to control life? And if life can be tech-
nologically domesticated, how do we domesti-
cate this new and powerful technology itself? A
similar question currently harrows the discover-
ers of CRISPR-Cas9 (Doudna and Sternberg,
2017). To address this question, our third meth-
odological principle must be activated, and the
ontological dimension of synthetic life must be
addressed. What kind of a thing will we be deal-
ing with?
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What kind of thing is a synthetic
cell?
There seems to be something exceptional about
creating synthetic life compared to other labora-
tory fabrications. The theory of vitalism proposes
that life is governed by a force distinct from the
standard chemical and physical forces that act
on inanimate objects. In 1944, the physicist
Erwin Schrödinger portrayed life in terms of
deviation: whereas nature is under the sway of
entropy, living cells maintain high levels of com-
plexity and resist disruption. (Back in 1933, Niels
Bohr had also pointed out how living systems
seem to defy the expectations of physics and
chemistry.) Schrödinger argued that the essence
of life is not Divine intervention (Genesis), elec-
tricity (Frankenstein) or radium (Burke), but a
genetic code: the genome (for comparison, see
Zwart, 2013).
The discovery of the molecular structure of
DNA by Watson and Crick was perceived by
many as a fatal blow to vitalism, for the genome
is basically a molecule: an “aperiodic crystal”, as
Schrödinger phrased it. Once we understand
this crystal, we will eventually be able to (in
Wagner’s terms) “crystallise” life in vitro.
Does this mean that public concerns should
be discarded as outdated remnants of vitalism?
Again, Goethe’s scene provides a telling hint,
for Wagner explicitly points out that his current
experiment is merely a first step. Eventually, the
idea is not to create life as such, but to produce
something even more ambitious and potentially
more disconcerting: something like a thinking
brain, challenging our unique position as rational
entities. However fragile and innocent synthetic
cells may seem, public discontent is triggered by
the suspicion that this is merely a first step
towards something more challenging and pro-
lific: a second Cambrian explosion of life-forms
may await us (Church and Regis, 2013). How
will these entities evolve? And do we have the
tools and policies in place to govern and contain
this potentially disruptive process?
As to the question “What kind of thing is a
synthetic cell?”, the famous article What is a
thing? by the philosopher Martin Heidegger pro-
vides a route to an answer (Heidegger, 1954).
In it, he explores the etymology of the term
“thing”, connecting it with the Old High German
“thing” or “dinc” and the proto Germanic
“þingą”, which originally mean an assembly or
congregation. A synthetic cell is a thing which
calls for a Thing: a public deliberation. In 1974, a
panel established by the National Academy of
Sciences in the US argued for a thorough assess-
ment of the potential social impacts of recombi-
nant DNA techniques (Berg et al., 1974). A
similar assessment, based on multiple voices and
perspectives is now needed to explore the
potential impacts of synthetic cells.
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